Preliminary Findings and Outlook of the CASHSS “Multiple Secularities – Beyond the West, Beyond Modernities”

© Christoph Kleine and Monika Wohlrab-Sahr

This Working Paper has been published online and can be downloaded from www.multiple-secularities.de/publications/working-papers or ordered in print via email to multiple-secularities@uni-leipzig.de

The CASHSS’s Working Paper Series serves to disseminate the results of work in progress prior to publication to encourage the exchange of ideas and academic debate. Inclusion of a paper in the Working Paper Series should not limit publication in any other venue. Copyright remains with the authors.

Please cite as:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36730/2020.1.msbwbm.22

Leipzig University
CASHSS “Multiple Secularities – Beyond the West, Beyond Modernities”
Nikolaistraße 8–10
04109 Leipzig
Germany

The CASHSS is part of Leipzig University and funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG).
Contents

1 Introduction and Background .................................................................................................................. 3
  1.1 History of the Research Project ................................................................................................. 3
  1.2 The Academic Debate ................................................................................................................ 5
  1.3 Current State of Research in Selected Research Areas .......................................................... 10

2 Research Findings from the First Funding Period (2016-2020) ...................................................... 13
  2.1 Further Developing and Refining the Concept ......................................................................... 13
  2.2 Assumptions and Hypotheses .................................................................................................. 15
    2.2.1 Internal Social Differentiation − Social Structures ..................................................... 15
    2.2.2 Taxonomies, Classifications, Knowledge Systems: Epistemic Structures.. 18
    2.2.3 Differentiation of Spheres of Activity ............................................................................ 24
    2.2.4 Reference Problems and Guiding Ideas ......................................................................... 26
    2.2.5 Cultural Interaction and Acquisition, Transfer, and Integration Processes .................. 29

3 The Centre for Advanced Studies' Aims in the Second Funding Period (2020–2024) ......................... 30
  3.1 Regional Expansion and Intercultural Encounter ................................................................. 30
  3.2 Systematic Perspectives ........................................................................................................... 37
    3.2.1 Critical Junctures and Path Probabilities ................................................................. 37
    3.2.2 Culturalisation of Religion, Materiality of the Secular ............................................. 38
    3.2.3 Art, Culture, and Architecture as Spheres of Activity .............................................. 42

4 Bibliography .................................................................................................................................. 45
Preliminary Findings and Outlook of the CASHSS “Multiple Secularities – Beyond the West, Beyond Modernities”

1 Introduction and Background
1.1 History of the Research Project
In its initial research project description, the Centre for Advanced Studies in Humanities and Social Sciences (CASHSS) took a position on the longstanding academic and public debates on secularism, secularisation, and secularity. In doing so, it referred to the concept of Multiple Secularities, which had been developed in a previous research project, and which Kleine had applied to pre-modern Japan. Against this backdrop, an idea arose for a multidisciplinary project combining sociology, history of religion and study of religions.

‘Secularity’ is an analytical concept, which seeks to avoid the ideological connotations of the term secularism. The term, which is conceived as an ideal-type, describes how conceptual distinctions and institutional differentiations are made between religious and non-religious spheres and practices. In this context, ‘differentiation’ is not a complete separation, but entails some form of relation between two conceptually distinguished spheres. The previous research project had taken an exploratory approach, comparing different countries, and had developed a typology of forms of secularity, which focused on reference problems, associated guiding ideas and resulting cultures of secularity. While non-Western forms of secularity were considered – albeit not systematically – research on pre-modern forms remained an unfulfilled ambition.

The CASHSS took up the concept of Multiple Secularities and developed it further. Based on the hypothesis that distinguishing and differentiating practices are not an exclusive sign of Western modernity, we decided to systematically explore regions beyond the ‘Western world’, and in doing so

3 Marian Burchardt, Monika Wohlrab-Sahr, and Matthias Middell, eds., Multiple Secularities Beyond the West: Religion and Modernity in the Global Age (Boston, MA: De Gruyter, 2015).
expand our research remit beyond that on which Taylor had focused. We focused on regions that have been culturally shaped by Islam (the MENA region, Indonesia, India), as well as on Asia, which necessarily involved some overlap. These regional contexts differed historically and still do so today in terms of their propensity for conflict over boundary demarcation and the way in which relationships are established between the religious and the non-religious. What they have in common is that the application of the term ‘religion’ to the respective socio-cultural traditions is highly controversial. Exploring these regions brought different religious traditions as well as experiences of the confrontation with the Western world into focus, suggesting the prospect of instructive comparisons.

In addition, we planned to systematically investigate pre-modern configurations and to critically analyse current religious distinctions and differentiations specifically with regard to their historical preconditions and possible antecedents, as well as various forms of historical entanglements. This went hand in hand with the question of whether, in addition to the historical disruption that generally resulted from confrontation with the ‘modern West’, there were also continuities that influenced how Western concepts and institutions were engaged with. Furthermore, entanglements between and within the investigated regions were to be analysed. Our interest in comparing context-specific variants of secularity was thus coupled with an interest in being able to better understand and explain modern developments and conflicts against the backdrop of historical structures and processes, and to identify possible development trajectories or path probabilities. Although Eisenstadt’s concept of ‘multiple modernities’ did inform our approach, we did not adopt his strong foundation in the theory of civilisation. Using secularity as a heuristic term when exploring pre-modern configurations does not mean equating these with modern configurations; nor does it mean neglecting the processes of comparison,

---

5 As the term ‘path dependence’ is susceptible to deterministic misinterpretation, we decided to replace it with the expression ‘path probability’. This broadly corresponds, however, with the understanding of path dependence in Giovanni Capoccia and R. Daniel Kelemen, “The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, Narrative, and Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism,” World Politics 59, no. 3 (2007).
differentiation and purification\(^7\) that commenced in modernity with what Dreßler\(^8\) terms “religionisation”.

The open format of the CASHSS is ideal for our research, which is necessarily reliant on expertise \textit{in} and \textit{from} different non-Western regions. Our research aims to initiate an international exchange with the objective of examining conceptual distinctions and institutional differentiations (secularities) in both modern and pre-modern configurations, and exploring the associated processes, dynamics, and development trajectories.

\textbf{1.2 The Academic Debate}

The research project's conceptual, historical and empirical approach was a response to the diverging camps into which research on religions had fallen. Roughly speaking, one side consisted of proponents of secularisation theory within the social sciences who, while acknowledging cultural divergences to a certain degree,\(^9\) regarded modernisation emanating from the ‘West’ and secularisation as being inextricably linked. One strand of this research assumes a convergence of global developments, while another emphasises the specific nature of Western developments.\(^10\) The other side of the debate comprised a heterogeneous group of fierce critics.

US sociologists, in particular, criticised European secularisation theories that assumed the demise of religiosity in the context of modernisation. The dimension of functional and institutional differentiation, particularly between religion and political power,\(^11\) was initially spared criticism.\(^12\) Critics later questioned the assumption of self-perpetuating differentiation

\footnotesize{\begin{itemize}
\end{itemize}}
Pursuing this line, Joas ultimately warned against the use of “dangerous nouns of process”.14

There was also criticism from within the field of the academic study of religions,15 which questioned whether the term ‘religion’ could be applied to non-Western societies (especially pre-modern ones) as ‘religion’ is an emic term of European provenance and a modern Western concept, and thus unsuited to the analysis of non-Western societies. The link between academic categorisation and colonial classification practices was also raised as an issue – criticism which inevitably extended to the concept of secularity.16 Post-colonial approaches, particularly those influenced by Asad, subjected the religious-secular binary to fundamental epistemic critique.17 These academics argued that the religious-secular binary was bound to European history and coupled to the rise of the nation state. They contended that perspectives on Islam, for instance, were distorted by a secular(ist) bias originating from the universalisation of the religious-


secular distinction shaped by Christianity. Similar arguments have been made for India and Japan.18

As the conceptual distinction and related research seemed inextricably linked to modernity as a political project, there was a determined shift towards a conceptual and discourse history perspective, where the discursive power of secularism and the genealogy of secular-religious distinctions were the focus.19 As a result, no space was left for investigating ‘indigenous’ distinctions and differentiations in the non-Western world that corresponded to the ‘Western’ distinction between the religious and the secular and which may have influenced the adoption of (or resistance to) such a distinction.

By critically intervening in these debates, we sought to re-open the way for a comparative study of religion and the secular. The aim was to make constructive use of the critics’ key concerns, in particular, their demands for the historicisation and contextualisation of theories, analytical categories and comparative concepts used,20 their sensitivity to power and violence, and their criticism of assumptions of automatic societal developments.

In doing this, we were able to link to differentiation-theoretical approaches applied in sociological research on secularisation. Chaves, for example, identifies secularisation as the declining influence of religious authority over other social spheres.21 Consequently, struggles for power, social movements and struggles against religious dominance become

---

18 For India see for example Ashis Nandy, “An Anti-Secularist Manifesto,” India International Centre Quarterly 22, no. 1 (1995); for Japan: Horii, “Critical Reflections.” Many of these studies, particularly in the Islamic world, tie in with criticism of political regimes, which are sometimes relatively sweepingingly described as ‘secularistic’ and judged to be incapable of dealing with religious diversity (e.g. Mahmood, Religious Difference in the Secular Age, and others. For a critical perspective, see: Andrew F. March, “Speaking about Muhammad, Speaking for Muslims,” Critical Inquiry 37, no. 4 (2011)). The same reservation also applies to studies regarding Muslims in Europe and North America, such as in the debate surrounding blasphemy, see Talal Asad, Judith Butler, and Saba Mahmood, Is Critique Secular? Blasphemy, Injury, and Free Speech (Berkeley, CA: Townsend Center, 2009).


analytically relevant both at the institutional and the individual level. Another important resource was Gorski’s critique of both sociological research on secularisation and the religious economies model, which is widespread in the US, and which, Gorski argues, ignores extensive epochs and variations of religious development. We were also able to link to the critical debate surrounding sociological differentiation theory and efforts – mainly by considering actors and networks – to enhance the explanatory power of differentiation-theoretical approaches. We considered the objection that had been raised to understanding differentiation as the division of labour, as well as the associated call for a conflict theory in line with Weber. Such a theory holds that conflict primarily arises between areas which have a “comprehensive capacity to create order”. We also found differentiation theory-oriented approaches, partly based on Luhmann, to be instructive.

Since the CASHSS was established, the normativity of the debate has not changed substantially, and our work has involved efforts to deal with this normativity. Our plea for a differentiation-theoretical perspective has made us part of this debate. What’s more, given the identitarian currents

in politics and academia, the focus on differentiation itself has become a political issue. However, contributions can now be found that critically discuss the narrowing of the post-colonial critique of secularism. The studies by Enayat and Rots/Teeuwen, which both refer to the concept of *Multiple Secularities*, are good examples: While it is not possible to recapitulate this discussion in detail here, this does show that our work has raised highly relevant questions both for academia and for politics.

It was also necessary for us to consider a recent reformulation of an old argument that, while aligned with differentiation theory, posits an exceptional position for the West in the process of functional differentiation. Pollack, for example, underlines the specificity of Western development against the background of the historical conflict between the Holy Roman Emperor and the Pope in the Investiture Controversy. According to Pollack, the Catholic Church’s claim to leadership (unintentionally) expedited the genesis of the modern Western world. Nowhere else had a religious institution asserted claims to truth and loyalty to this extent, which is why processes of functional differentiation developed so extensively in the Latin Church. Steckel has countered this by pointing to recurring dynamics of ‘re-differentiation’ in the course of the Middle Ages. She argues that Pollack’s theory is too bound to the

---


image of a ‘rise of the West’. Again, we cannot discuss this in detail here (to do so would involve making a comparison on a global scale). In any case, the debate suggests a research programme that corresponds exactly with our agenda, namely, instigating a global analytical comparison of the historical conditions and processes through which different configurations of conceptual distinctions and institutional differentiation evolved.

1.3 Current State of Research in Selected Research Areas
Given the CASHSS’ comparative empirical approach, it was relevant to also look at the current state of research in selected research areas. This helped us to differentiate the Multiple Secularities approach and ensure we were covering sufficient material. We have briefly outlined the current state of research in a few research areas below.

In the debate regarding the relationship between secularity and Islam, which is dominated by theories on their incompatibility,\(^{31}\) Jackson recently coined the term “the Islamic secular”,\(^ {32}\) He assumes a differentiation between shari’a and that which is outside shari’a’s jurisdictional limits and describes a differentiation between the religious and the secular for the Islamic tradition, which, as it were, is reintegrated under the umbrella of Islam. Recently, both Yavari and Leder have detailed how the differentiation of the sultanate and the caliphate was discursively legitimised within political theories developed during the period when the power of the Abbasid Caliphate was declining.\(^ {33}\) Yavari even points to an “incipient secularism” in the mirrors for princes literature.\(^ {34}\) She also shows that an implicit religious-secular distinction was made in the context of Sufism in early modern Iran – irrespective of notions of a secular society: “It recognises a political realm that must be tamed by religion, and an ideational sphere of religion which must be tempered to make good government possible.”\(^ {35}\) The authors listed above all question

\(^ {31}\) See, for example, John L. Esposito and Azzam Tamimi, eds., Islam and Secularism in the Middle East (London: Hurst, 2000).
\(^ {34}\) Yavari, Advice for the Sultan, 83.
\(^ {35}\) Neguin Yavari, “The Political Regard in Medieval Islamic Thought,” in “Islamicate
the uniqueness of European problems and concepts and encourage analysis of indigenous concepts of secularity and their precursors in cultures influenced by Islam.36

For Japan, in addition to Kleine,37 more recently Teeuwen,38 Paramore,39 and Reader,40 among others, have pointed to pre-modern practices of distinction that are to some extent analogous to Western forms of secularity. Influenced by Buddhism, strong conceptual distinctions and institutional differentiations between ‘mundane’ and ‘religious’ powers or nomospheres can be found above all in the Japanese concept of the interdependence of the ruler’s nomosphere and the Buddha’s nomosphere (ōbō buppō sō’i).41 Something similar can be found in pre-modern Tibet (e.g. chos srid gnyis or chos srid zung ’brel),42 in Mongolia43 and in Bhutan,44 although the corresponding institutional arrangements were completely different.

In his response to Taylor, Bhargava writes of an “Ancient Indian Secular Age“,45 thereby pointing to continuities between pre-modernity and

---

36 See the special issue Dressler, Salvatore, and Wohlrab-Sahr, eds., “Islamicate Secularities.”


45 Rajeev Bhargava, “An Ancient Indian Secular Age?,” in Beyond the Secular West, ed. Akeel
modernity in India. For imperial China, Roetz has shown that “elements of a secular civilization were a reality in China long before latter-day Western philosophers strove for it.”46 Indeed, particularly during the Enlightenment, China was regarded by some Europeans as an exemplary case of a secular state and enlightened monarchy, and thus also inspired ‘Western’ concepts of a secular state. For Japan, too, “elements of secularization avant la lettre” have been diagnosed,47 with the characterisation of corresponding configurations as (proto-)forms of secularity provoking fierce criticism.48 The critics argued that pre-modern non-European cultures must not be compared with modern Western cultures using European concepts. This argument in turn was criticised by others as lending support to Japanese conservatives and those who promote theories about the unique nature of the Japanese people (*nihonjinron*), and claim that Western distinctions between the religious and the non-religious are not transferable to Japan.49 The religious character of Shintō has been disputed on the basis of such cultural particularism, with efforts made to change Japan’s secular constitution in order to enable state support for and participation in Shintō festivals. Investigation into historical antecedents, conceptual resources or cultural imprints in societies ‘beyond the secular West’ has now started to bear fruit,50 and has also included responses to Taylor.51 As Sheehan has emphasised, more in-depth research into the “resources of the nonreligious”, including responses to Taylor, would also seem useful for European history.52

When it comes to the antecedent historical conditions for forms of

---


48 Horii, “Critical Reflections.”


secularity, we do not claim mere continuity or even cultural inevitability. We will continue to consider the matter of path probabilities for certain forms of social differentiation and conceptual distinctions, particularly with regard to the possibility of alternative, unrealised paths. If distinctions were institutionalised in early Islamic tradition, for instance, and then merged again under Islam, this does not mean that sharper distinctions would not be possible in the Islamic world. However, it would be particularly difficult to prove the existence of these conceptual distinctions, even though a ‘cultivated’ tradition of differentiation between the ‘religious’ and the ‘secular’ was indeed established.

2 Research Findings from the First Funding Period (2016–2020)

In the first four years, our work was determined by the following leading questions:

1. Which forms of defining and structuring the relationship between the religious and the non-religious can be identified and described in the selected regions?
2. How can differences with regard to the form of secularity be understood and explained in relation to historical, socio-economic, political and cultural conditions?

In the course of our work, it became clear that our aim could not be to conclusively answer these questions. Instead, we worked to establish a field of research, and provide the necessary conceptual basis and empirical evidence for that research. Consequently, our work involved refining and operationalising terms in response to numerous empirical and historical studies.

2.1 Further Developing and Refining the Concept

Maintaining the formal definition of ‘secularity’ as institutionally as well as symbolically embedded forms and arrangements for distinguishing between religion and other societal areas, and initiating an international discussion

on this definition has proven to be effective. Unlike the prevalent focus on ‘secularism’ with its strongly normative implications, the analytical concept of ‘secularity’ has opened up a new research perspective and stimulated a revision of historical and empirical data.

It was both difficult and time-consuming to refine concepts and determine theoretical approaches and perspectives, tasks which were necessary in order to establish a new transdisciplinary field of research. It was important in this endeavour to find a balance between more descriptive empirical or historical approaches on the one hand and more theory-based systematic approaches on the other. It was also necessary to repeatedly reflect on the transcultural use of comparative concepts such as ‘secularity’ and ‘religion’, to consistently historicise debatable concepts, and to emphasise their cultural dependence on context and historical contingency, as well as the entanglement of their genesis with political power.

In the course of numerous discussions, it became clear that we needed to analytically separate conceptual distinctions and social differentiations. It also became clear that there was a risk of restricting the term ‘secularity’ to connote impermeable separation. We therefore refined our working definition. Conceiving ‘secularities’ as an ideal type, we now understand ‘secularities’ as interrelated epistemic and social structures, in which the religious and the non-religious are socially differentiated (institutionally, legally, organisationally, spatially, habitually, lifeworldly, etc.) and are conceptually distinguished (taxonomically, semantically, discursively, symbolically, etc.) by relevant actors in a binary schema, whereby the corresponding demarcations can be variable, negotiable, controversial, and blurred. We are therefore combining a formal analytical concept with an interest in structures of conceptual distinction and social differentiation that can be identified empirically. Our empirical and historical research involves identifying such distinctions and differentiations and establishing the substantive content of the distinct areas.

When analytically separating epistemic and social structures, as well as conceptual distinctions and institutional differentiations, one must remember that, in the social reality, both are entangled. ‘Secularity’ is not an object language term but a comparative concept, which is supposed to

capture a certain modality of making distinctions and a corresponding state of differentiation. As a modality, the special feature of secularity is its binary construction. As an actual state, this binary construction does not exist. Only when social differentiation is interpreted – by actors and in discourse – through the lens of a distinction between the religious and the non-religious, and this distinction becomes structurally relevant, can the social differentiation be characterised as secularity. In other words, only when the social differentiation of ‘religion’ as a sphere of action (i.e. as a social structure) produces a binary schema in people’s perception (i.e. as an epistemic structure), does a form of secularity emerge from an initially diffuse and diverse social differentiation. An important focus of the second funding period will therefore have to be to identify the markers\textsuperscript{55} that indicate social differentiations.

2.2 Assumptions and Hypotheses

2.2.1 Internal Social Differentiation – Social Structures

One of our main initial hypotheses was that boundary demarcation between the religious and the non-religious was not an exclusive sign of ‘modernity’ or ‘the Western world’. We assume that every society has forms of internal differentiation, although it must remain open for now whether these can be adequately described with the term ‘secularity’.

In the globalised modern era, the use of the attribute ‘religious’ (or corresponding semantic equivalents), and likewise the attribute ‘secular’ for non-religious matters, is well established. Globally, secularity is generally accepted as a politically, legally and thus socio-structurally relevant modality of making distinctions - but not as a term to designate this modality. It is evident that what Stausberg calls attributive differentiation,\textsuperscript{56} that is, the differentiation of certain facts and circumstances as religious, falls within the area of conceptual distinctions or epistemic structures in our conceptual framework. However, this process of attribution is structurally relevant and dependent on social structures even in its genesis. Usually, we find that objects, actions, roles, discourses, concepts, symbols, architecture, etc. are marked as religious because they are located in certain institutional


contexts. In short, whether something can be given the attribute ‘religious’ is both structure-dependent and structure-forming.

As a consequence of the ‘religionisation’ of complex socio-cultural formations that occurred in large parts of the world in the wake of modernisation, certain organisations (religious groups, shūkyō dantai, zongjiao tuanti, agama, ṭāʾīfah, jamāʿah dīniyyah, sampradaya, mazhab…) have become the sole legitimate guardians of the religious. Legal recognition of certain organisations as religions, which frequently occurred as part of legal codification in modern nation states (e.g. recognition as a ‘religious corporation’, shūkyō hōjin or similar), which gave them a legal status, generally went hand in hand with interdependent processes of ‘comparison’ with other religions, ‘differentiation’ from other societal spheres, and ‘purification’ from ‘superstition’, myths, cosmology, etc.57 ‘Religion’ has thus become both a legal category and a comparative concept,58 with the boundaries between the religious and the secular drawn more sharply than before, at both the actor and the observer level. “Cultures of ambiguity”59 are being eliminated, which does not end contentious debates over boundary demarcation, but often provokes or inflames them in the first place.60 These social structures, defined by Stausberg as “structural differentiation”,61 occur at the meso-level. The majority of investigations into boundary demarcation conflicts between the religious and the non-religious take place at the meso-level, and often relate to religious and state organisations. As one might expect, when identifying social structures in pre-modern societies, it is the macro-level of functional differentiation – often prioritised in differentiation theory – which causes the biggest problems. For this reason, it proved useful to start by focusing on differentiations at the organisational level. To avoid anachronisms when it comes to the retrospective labelling of organisations as ‘religious’, we propose using current classifications.

57 Hermann, “Distinctions of Religion.”
58 Ruth Streicher and Adrian Hermann, “‘Religion’ in Thailand in the 19th Century,” in Companion to the Study of Secularity, ed. CASHSS “Multiple Secularities – Beyond the West, Beyond Modernities” (Leipzig University, 2019).
61 Stausberg, “Distinctions, Differentiations, Ontology, and Non-humans.”
that is, organisations that are legally and/or conventionally classified as ‘religious’ today.

In the pre-modern era in particular (though not only then), ‘religious’ organisations participated in societal activities that we would not necessarily classify as ‘religious’ today. Despite this, we think it is possible to identify certain core activities (e.g. communication with transcendent powers) and communicative codes (e.g. the distinction between transcendence and immanence), and to distinguish these from peripheral activities (e.g. agriculture, healing the sick, etc.). Situations of cultural encounter provide a good opportunity to understand the formation of an organised nexus of societal activities in terms of a historical macro-sociological differentiation.\footnote{Cf. Tenbruck who argues that cultural comparison is initiated during inter-cultural encounters, i.e. much earlier than formal academic cultural comparison would have you believe. Friedrich H. Tenbruck, “Was war der Kulturvergleich, ehe es den Kulturvergleich gab?,” in *Soziale Welt: Zwischen den Kulturen?*, ed. Joachim Matthes (Göttingen: Schwartz, 1992).} For example, where two organisations of different origins, which would both be considered ‘religious’ today, perceived each other as competitors, when conversions took place between them, and equivalent terminologies were agreed or established in the process of cultural translation (as was the case with the Jesuits and Buddhist orders in Japan), there are good reasons to consider these organisations as representative of a shared sphere of activity. For the operationalisation of our differentiation theory suppositions, we therefore also propose the *historical analysis of mutual cultural comparisons* including organisations that are related genealogically to today’s religious organisations.\footnote{For one such attempt, see Christoph Kleine, “Premodern Intercultural and Interreligious Dialogues and the Formation of Comparative Concepts: How Encounters Between European Missionaries and Japanese in the 16th and 17th centuries changed the conceptual world.” *NotaBene*, no. 44 (2019). (Part I) (Part II)}

Particular attention should be paid to configurations in which two institutions appear as competing or complementary powers and form a binary power structure. Weber wrote of the “struggle between the military and temple nobility, between the royal and the priestly following” being fundamental to the development of states and societies.\footnote{Max Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft: Grundriss der verstehenden Soziologie* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1985 [1921/22]), 690. English: Max Weber, Guenther Roth, and Claus Wittich, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 1160.} Pollack, in turn, recently highlighted how competition between the Pope and the
Holy Roman Emperor significantly shaped the specific characteristics of European secularisation.\textsuperscript{65} Similar power configurations also existed in mediaeval Japan. We suspect that it was these particular institutional and political configurations that promoted the development of binary schemas in both Europe and Japan, and in Europe ultimately formed the basis for secularity being established as a central organisational principle of the modern state. The fact that this did not happen in the same way in Japan is probably due in part to the fact that epistemes taken on from China, which prescribe the absolute sovereignty of the ruler over all other institutions and regulatory powers, continued to have a subliminal effect. Moreover, in comparison to the Roman Catholic Church, the Buddhist orders were highly fragmented, with individual monasteries often in fierce competition with each other,\textsuperscript{66} and there was no central authority that could have confronted the ruler. In Europe, the dominant position and institutional autonomy of the Catholic Church provided an impetus that initiated processes of differentiation in the field of politics \textit{in response}.\textsuperscript{67} In contrast, while the impulse for differentiation in Japan also came from religious institutions, these institutions sought to secure \textit{their own autonomy} from the state. This provides an initial response to the question of the role played by institutional actors in differentiation processes: It is religious organisations, in this case Buddhist monasteries, that pursue organisational interests and underpin them with corresponding legitimising theories in the first place.

\subsection*{2.2.2 Taxonomies, Classifications, Knowledge Systems: Epistemic Structures}

In our initial project description, we assumed that all societies developed taxonomies to organise a hyper-complex world by classifying natural and cultural facts in an abstract manner, and to provide orientation within this world. In the course of our work, we increasingly conceptualised cognitive-, normative-, and also aesthetic- and affection-oriented\textsuperscript{68}

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{Pollack1998} Pollack, \textit{Religion und gesellschaftliche Differenzierung}.
\bibitem{Pollack1998} Pollack, \textit{Religion und gesellschaftliche Differenzierung}.
\end{thebibliography}
taxonomies and classifications that are consolidated in specific knowledge systems, as *epistemic structures*. As such an epistemic structure, secularity would be a specific binary modality for perceiving and interpreting the social environment, in which social facts and circumstances are either classified as religious or secular.

Given the dominance of discursive sources, relevant conceptual distinctions or epistemic structures are much easier to identify than social structures, particularly when it comes to historical analysis. This has resulted in many sub-projects and publications to date taking semantic approaches. 69 Diachronic examinations of relevant dictionaries and encyclopaedias can be a useful starting point in the search for taxonomies, classifications and knowledge systems. 70 However, pre-modern sources primarily have taxonomies that are used for specific purposes in specific situations. They rarely have universally valid classification systems and clear taxonomies. Classification systems, which may be considered as precursors to or early or special forms of secularity owing to their binary structure and the ways in which they are semantically similar to modern distinctions between the religious and the secular, are almost exclusively to be found in discourse contexts in which two institutions formulate extensive normative claims of validity. 71 It would appear that a duality of such nomospheres can develop particularly strongly where there is a well-organised and, above all, monastic priesthood, as in Christianity and Buddhism. As heterotopias, 72 monasteries often represent nomospheres in

69 The issue of emic taxonomies and indigenous knowledge systems in pre-modern Asia was the subject of the workshop ‘Formations of Secularity in pre-modern Asian societies’, which the CASHSS ran in collaboration with the Arbeitskreis “Asiatische Religionsgeschichte” (Working Group on History of Religions in Asia, AKAR) within the German Association for the Study of Religions (DVRW). The findings of this workshop will soon be published in *Critical Studies in Religion/Religionswissenschaft*, a publication of V&R. The subject was discussed in more depth at our conference “Secularities - Patterns of Distinction, Paths of Differentiation” in October 2018.

70 Markus Dreßler (Ottoman and Turkish dictionaries), Hubert Seiwert (encyclopaedias and dictionaries in pre-modern China) and Christoph Kleine (encyclopaedias and dictionaries in pre-modern Japan) have notably taken this approach.

71 See Goldenberg, who conceptualises religions as “vestigial states” – that is, as the “cultural remnants of former sovereignties that persist within current states” (40). She assumes that “religious and secular law” are to be understood as both “types of regulation” and “products of similar social motives and processes” (52). Naomi R. Goldenberg, “Theorizing Religions as Vestigial States in Relation to Gender and Law: Three Cases,” *Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion* 29, no. 1 (2013).

72 Michel Foucault, “Andere Räume,” in *Aisthesis: Wahrnehmung heute oder Perspektiven einer
which a fully rationalised, salvation-oriented way of life is fostered, which holds a mirror up, as it were, to the incomplete (secular) way of life outside the monastery.

It is only in modern states with a separation of powers that the field of law becomes independent and develops its own relationship to religion, partly independent of politics. In reality, boundary demarcation debates between the religious and the secular in modern societies often occur in the form of legal disputes. In pre-modern societies, by contrast, negotiations about boundaries, areas of jurisdiction and responsibilities of religious versus non-religious powers generally occurred between ‘the throne and the altar’. Whether in contrasting normative guidelines for kings (Arthaśāstra) and Brahmins (Dharma-śāstra) in ancient India, in the paradigm of the “interdependence of the ruler’s law and the Buddha’s law” in pre-modern Japan, and analogous distinctions in Tibet, Bhutan (chos-srid-gnyis) and Sri Lanka, be it in the Islamised pre-Islamic notion of state and religion as twins (din va daulat) in Iran

---

73 Many of our fellows’ projects explore questions pertaining to the legal form of the relationship between the religious and the secular. Sociologist Anindita Chakrabarti is examining the complex relationship between Islamic and civil courts in Uttar Pradesh, India; jurist Muchamad Ali Safa’at is investigating the relationship between secular and Islamic law in Indonesia; Muktiono is researching blasphemy legislation in Indonesia; Arabist Hans-Georg Ebert is researching religious legal systems with a focus on land law in countries in the MENA region; study of religions scholar and Japanologist Mark R. Mullins is investigating constitutional law issues linked to boundary demarcation between the religious and the secular in post-war Japan. Tibetologist Dagmar Schwerk (Bhutan) and sociologist Nader Sohrabi (Iran) are also researching constitutional issues. Hubert Seiwert has published a theoretical interpretation of legal debates surrounding boundary demarcation. See Hubert Seiwert, “Religiöser Nonkonformismus in säkularen Gesellschaften,” Zeitschrift für Religionswissenschaft 23, no. 1 (2015).


75 For example Kleine, “Religion and the Secular in Premodern Japan.”

76 Seyfort Ruegg, Ordre spirituel et ordre temporel; Roesler, “Die Lehre, der Weg und die namenlose Religion.”

77 Among others, our fellows Matthew King and Karénina Kollmar-Paulenz are working on this.

78 As Dagmar Schwerk shows, the principle of the dual sovereignty of ‘religion’ (more precisely Skt. dharma as in Buddhism or Tib. chos) and ‘politics’ (srid) even found its way into Bhutan’s modern constitution. See Schwerk, “Drawing Lines in a Mandala.”

79 Our fellow Sven Bretfeld is researching similar concepts of mutual dependence between king and sāsana (that is, Buddhism).

80 Neguin Yayari is working on distinctions between religion and politics in pre-modern Iran.
or the “soft distinction” between adab and shari’a in the pre-colonial Islamicate world\textsuperscript{81} – we are always dealing with a competition, codified ideologically as complementarity,\textsuperscript{82} between two nomospheres, for each of which an institution or a group of actors claims exclusive responsibility. Comparisons with Gelasius’ two-swords theory or Luther’s two-kingdoms theory suggest themselves. And if one follows Pollack’s argument that Christian efforts to distinguish areas of responsibility significantly influenced the European process of secularisation,\textsuperscript{83} it seems expedient to start with such binary figures of distinction in order to identify socio-structurally founded epistemic structures which have helped to shape the debate on modern Western normative forms of secularism (in the sense of secularity as a prerequisite for state legitimacy). This comparison of the differentiation and interrelation of areas of responsibility as a basic pattern of institutional differentiation will be extended and deepened in the second funding phase with a focus on different cultural contexts.

Our work has shown that not all forms of semantic distinction or social differentiation between spheres of activity, organisations or interactions can be meaningfully described as ‘secularity’, even if one of the entities being distinguished is marked as religious from an emic or etic perspective. Secularity is rather to be understood as a special form of conceptual distinction and social differentiation whose constitutive structural element and distinguishing feature is the binary nature of the distinction between the religious and the non-religious.

But even though diverse phenomena do not appear to have a clear affiliation with either of the two sides (e.g. superstition, spirituality, the occult, spiritism, magic),\textsuperscript{84} this does not change the efficacy of the binary structure itself, which is, however, only the expression of a certain view

\textsuperscript{81} Armando Salvatore, “The Islamicate Adab Tradition vs. the Islamic Shari’a, from Pre-Colonial to Colonial,” Working Paper Series of the CASHSS “Multiple Secularities – Beyond the West, Beyond Modernities” 3 (Leipzig University, 2018).

\textsuperscript{82} In religions with a strong concept of transcendence, the distinction between ‘the religious’ and ‘the political’ is generally interpreted as only being temporarily valid. This distinction will be overcome at a higher level or at a later time, or both the religious and the political are deemed to have the same source. The concept of absolute transcendence necessarily excludes true dualism.

\textsuperscript{83} Pollack, Religion und gesellschaftliche Differenzierung.

\textsuperscript{84} Our fellows Martin Ramstedt and Edith Franke have, among other things, investigated the distinction between ‘belief’ (kepercayaan) and ‘religion’ (agama) in Indonesia.
of the world. Indeed, the emergence of a “hidden ‘third’”\textsuperscript{85} that eludes classification as either religious or secular, is itself the consequence of the process of ‘religionisation’ mentioned above. While in the late 19\textsuperscript{th} and early 20\textsuperscript{th} centuries, it was primarily the categorisation of heterodox worldviews (‘superstitions’), ethnic religious customs (‘folk religions’) and academically marginalised claims to knowledge (‘parascience’) that was controversial; today, it appears to be first and foremost the question of allocating certain societal actions and institutions either to \textit{religion} or to \textit{culture}\textsuperscript{86} and \textit{custom} that is politically controversial. We use the working term ‘culturalisation’ to refer to the reinterpretation of matters that have generally been classified as ‘religious’. Examples such as the dispute surrounding the categorisation of societal activities, institutions and rituals in modern Japan\textsuperscript{87} and China, as well as discussions about the religious or merely cultural symbolic value of crucifixes in Bavaria, Poland or Quebec, or of yoga in India, highlight the genuine ambiguity of diverse cultural elements on the one hand. On the other, they also draw attention to the politically motivated tendency to intentionally play on this ambiguity in line with an observable global shift towards emphasising national characteristics and cultural or ethnic identities. Meyer and de Witte\textsuperscript{88} detail a special case of culturalisation, the naming of religious sites and practices as UNESCO World Heritage, which they refer to as ‘heritagisation’. Once classified as heritage, the sites and


\textsuperscript{86} On the ambiguity and fuzziness of the concept of ‘culture’, particularly when related to religion, see Krech, \textit{Wo bleibt die Religion?}, 151–63.


\textsuperscript{88} Birgit Meyer and Marleen de Witte, “Heritage and the sacred: Introduction,” \textit{Material Religion} 9, no. 3 (2013).
practices are deprivatised and secularised, but also sacralised as the “public sacred”. Culturalisation is not limited to state identity politics that privileges cultural majorities (e.g. Hindu nationalism, and Buddhist nationalism in Sri Lanka and Myanmar), it is also a means by which ethnic minorities can assert themselves. As the reinterpretation associated with ‘heritagisation’ often has legal and institutional consequences, the interrelatedness of classifications and social structures is particularly evident here.

In any event, secularity is particularly significant as a context-independent distinguishing practice and specific ordering principle, because it primarily regulates the relationship between two institutionalised powers – the state and religions – that both claim general normative and (to a lesser extent) cognitive validity. States claim to regulate societal affairs through binding laws and regulations but also to establish certain types of behaviour and conduct via education, and to expand epistemic structures through academia. Religions, on the other hand, seek to provide coherent systems of cognitive and normative orientation. Empirical studies to date have found that secularity as a specific modality of distinction primarily comes into effect when there are conflicts over whether the state or religions are responsible for regulating and interpreting human actions. It would also appear that the binary nature of secularity has specifically religious roots, stemming from a religious logic where everything that is not included within the religious is marked as ‘secular’ and thus singularised, an approach first adapted by states in (initially Western) modernity. Religious claims to autonomy are being superseded or replaced by efforts to emancipate non-religious areas of society from religious intervention. As modern states claim validity as the highest authority on cognitive and normative


90 Our fellows Sven Bretfeld and Madlen Krüger are working on these areas.

91 See the studies on the Bribris in Costa Rica, which our fellow Bjørn Ola Tafjord outlined in a guest lecture. See also Bjørn Ola Tafjord, “Scales, Translations, and Siding Effects: Uses of indígena and religión in Talamanca and Beyond,” in Religious Categories and the Construction of the Indigenous, ed. Christopher Hartney and Daniel Tower (Leiden: Brill, 2017). Our fellow Edith Franke is researching the categorisation of the belief and practices of ethnic minorities in Indonesia.
orientation, as well as responsibility for the law, science, education, healing and societal affairs, etc., secularity is increasingly becoming a limiting practice, which while often granting religion a special legal status, restricts it in areas that have traditionally fallen within its competence.

In the course of the project, we have repeatedly returned to the question of whether the adjective ‘secular’, as a property that is negatively correlated to ‘religion’, ought not to be positively determinable, particularly where we identify precursors to secularity without there being an associated terminology. When formulating competing claims to validity, the adjective ‘secular’ is regularly associated in different discourse contexts with connotations such as ‘rational’, ‘taking human beings as a model’, ‘knowledge-based’, and ‘empirically grounded’, and is thus normatively loaded. The discussion regarding whether it is useful or even necessary for the application of the formal term ‘secularity’ that ‘the secular’ be determinable as a distinctive form of the non-religious, is yet to be resolved. This has also raised the question as to which markers are used to establish a distinction from the religious in different lifeworld contexts.

2.2.3 Differentiation of Spheres of Activity
In the research project description for the first funding period, we also determined that we would examine the differentiation of religion and the dependent formation of secularity from a macro-sociological perspective: investigating the differentiation of functional sub-systems or spheres of activity.

As a test case for processes of boundary demarcation between societal spheres of activity, we looked at healing, as the complex relationship between religion and healing forces us to ask very precise questions in order to disentangle the web of meanings, competences, roles, means and

---

92 See also Bochinger, “Das Verhältnis zwischen Religion und Säkularität.”
93 These include forms of relativising or distancing oneself from religious claims to validity, without explicitly taking a secular perspective.
94 Participating in the sixth Semana Internacional de la Cultura Laica (International Week of Lay/Secular Culture) at the National Autonomous University of Mexico in April 2019 was informative on this subject, focused as it was on the principle of self-determination. For ancient China, Hubert Seiwert has proposed, for example, looking for purely inner-worldly interpretations of ritual actions as an indicator of secular perspectives, such as Confucius’ warning that one should sacrifice to ancestors and spirits “as if they were present” (祭如在) (Lúnyǔ III.12).
95 Bonn, Knöppler, and Souza, eds., Was machen Marker.
purposes connected to healing as a “subset of human social ontology”. As an “integral activity bundle”, healing also fulfils a clear function, which is of the utmost relevance both subjectively for individuals and objectively for societies. In contrast, the institutional positioning of actors who provide healing services, is diverse or unclear, particularly (though not exclusively) in pre-modern societies. Graduates of state academies, monks, nuns, and individual healers of the most diverse hues compete against each other to offer their healing services.

A working group looked intensively at activities at the interface of that which is categorised as ‘religion’ and ‘medicine’ in modern taxonomies, taking the examples of pre-modern India, China and Japan. For the purposes of operationalisation, the working group initially isolated factors that could indicate approaches to differentiation between the spheres of ‘religion’ and ‘medicine’. These were distinctions related to (1) purposes (e.g. salvation vs. healing), (2) means (e.g. material vs. spiritual), (3) interpretations (e.g. transcendent vs. immanent origins of the disease and/or its treatment), (4) competences (e.g. formal training vs. personal charisma), and (5) sources of authority (e.g. reason and observation vs. revelation and canonicity). The last two factors in particular indicate both epistemic and social structures.

In the second funding period, we want to consider boundary demarcations between ‘religion’ and ‘art’ (including music, theatre, architecture, etc.) in a similar vein, without assuming spheres of activity that are self-evident today to have been differentiated as functional systems in all historical contexts, or assuming they have abstract functions such as those laid out in Luhmann’s systems theory. We will first consider how the tasks and purposes of certain organised networks of societal activities are defined in concrete discourses. That is, which reference problems they are responding to and which associated guiding ideas are formulated.

---

98 See also Bernadett Bigalke, “Religion and Medicine in Mazdaznan: Distinction Without Differentiation,” in *Companion to the Study of Secularity*, ed. CASHSS “Multiple Secularities – Beyond the West, Beyond Modernities” (Leipzig University, 2019).
2.2.4 Reference Problems and Guiding Ideas

The previous research project conceptualised four *reference problems* in response to which forms of differentiation between the religious and the non-religious take shape: (1) individual freedom, (2) balancing religious diversity, (3) societal development and national integration, and (4) the independent development of institutional domains.\(^{100}\) For various reasons, these are not readily transferable to pre-modern societies. The underlying empirical reference to national societies is not necessarily appropriate to pre-modern contexts. Equally, identifying reference problems has proven to be difficult when it comes to method. While guiding ideas can be clearly identified in discourse, whole societal reference problems can at best be reconstructed indirectly from discourse. It therefore seems to make sense to no longer assume reference problems, and interpret guiding ideas as the secondary reaction to these, but rather to start with the guiding ideas and consider these (taking into consideration the respective organisational and interactional contexts, as well as the particular institutional interests) as indicators for possible reference problems, and to successively expand and adjust the spectrum of reference problems for pre-modern societies.

Guiding ideas, which justify the institutional differentiation of two nomospheres by pointing to the autonomy of the religious as a prerequisite for its efficiency as a civilising power for stabilising societal order, seem to address, for example, the reference problem of securing dominance. The guiding idea of the independent development of the religious sphere as a condition for social order and stable rule seems to be central, at least in pre-modern societies, and it is evident that securing social order and stable rule was actually perceived as a reference problem. For example, in early modern Islam, approaches to distinguishing between religious and civil spheres were combined with ideas of civilising and “good rule”.\(^{101}\)

In contrast, for ancient India, Bhargava has associated the reference to Emperor Aśoka’s (r. ca. 268–232) ‘secular’ reign with the practice of tolerating competing ascetic communities and their teaching systems (*dhamma*) as can be interpreted from the famous rock and pillar edicts. This appears to be a rare piece of pre-modern evidence in which the values of religious diversity, mutual tolerance and the development of individual

---

100 Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt, “Multiple Secularities.”
religiosity are propagated as intrinsic values\textsuperscript{102} – even though it seems clear that these values were ultimately supposed to prevent conflicts and thus secure dominance in the first place. Guiding ideas for differentiating between religious and non-religious areas can thus also be analysed in pre-modern societies and conclusions can be drawn about the perception of societal problems. We argue that these guiding ideas serve as conceptual resources for culture-specific forms of secularity under the conditions of global modernity.

A specific situation in relation to the formulation of guiding ideas of secularity can be seen in societies with experiences of colonisation (such as India and Indonesia), societies faced with the threat of colonisation (such as Japan and Siam), and those that experienced authoritarian rule by Western-oriented governments (such as Iran and Turkey). These experiences of external rule shaped their dealings with secularity – thus confirming the stance of post-colonial critique. The rejection of Western modernity for different reasons, as it culminated in Iran, for example, in the term ‘Westoxification’ (gharbzadegi), creates a particular reference problem in the countries in question, which can be described as preserving cultural identity in the context of participation in global modernity. This should be considered in the interpretation as there is substantial resistance to that which is treated as ‘secularism’, particularly in the Islamic world.\textsuperscript{103} In response to this reference problem, religion is often presented as an ‘authentic’ source of identity – a position which has, in turn, been criticised as an auratisation of the pre-colonial past within post-colonial discourse.\textsuperscript{104} This configuration points to the fact that different responses can be found to societal reference problems: ‘Secularism’ and ‘religionism’ are conceivable and exist as responses to the same problem.\textsuperscript{105}


\textsuperscript{104} Mufti, “The Aura of Authenticity.”

The formulation of guiding ideas marks the transition from more implicit or de facto\textsuperscript{106} forms of distinction to explicit forms, such as those formulated in ideological terms when secularising the law, or within political secularism. This transition is tied to groups of supporters or individuals such as intellectuals propagating such ideas publicly (and through the media). We learnt a lot from studying the print press in the Arabic-speaking world from the mid-19\textsuperscript{th} century.\textsuperscript{107} The press was the central arena for negotiating the modern socio-political order – including issues of secularism and secularity. Initially, these debates were particularly fostered by Syrian Lebanese intellectuals with Christian backgrounds who were the first and the most explicit in taking on European ideas and political positions. The civilisational progress perceived in the avoidance of sectarian violence was one of the guiding ideas that was promoted in this context. In contrast, Islamic media almost entirely rejected secularism as a foreign, exclusively European Christian doctrine, and Islamic intellectuals, for their part, who also acted within the modern context of structural secular differentiation, developed the conceptual distinction of secularity within an Islamic framework, creatively combining contemporary European ideas with traditional Islamic Arabic concepts.

At the same time, a somewhat different configuration was to be found in the Ottoman Empire where the call for political reform was primarily made by the Young Ottomans. One of their guiding ideas was the unity and renewal of the state in light of the increasing threat from nationalist-motivated separatism. The path they proposed was not secularist, however. Instead, they regarded a political return to using shari’a as the basis of an Ottoman constitution as the only opportunity to secure the well-being of all religious groups in the empire. Explicit formulations of secularity only gained significance in the late Ottoman-Turkish period.

\textsuperscript{106} Saïd Amir Arjomand, “Secularisation Through Legal Modernisation in the MENA-Region,” in Companion to the Study of Secularity, ed. CASHSS “Multiple Secularities – Beyond the West, Beyond Modernities” (Leipzig University, 2019).

\textsuperscript{107} Florian Zemmin, Daniel Kinitz and Mohammad Magout have been working on debates in the Arabic press. Florian Zemmin, “Secularism, Secularity and Islamic Reformism,” in Companion to the Study of Secularity, ed. CASHSS “Multiple Secularities – Beyond the West, Beyond Modernities” (Leipzig University, 2019) and Mohammad Magout, “Secularity and the Syro-Lebanese Press in the 19\textsuperscript{th} Century,” in Companion to the Study of Secularity, ed. CASHSS “Multiple Secularities – Beyond the West, Beyond Modernities” (Leipzig University, 2019).
2.2.5 Cultural Interaction and Acquisition, Transfer, and Integration Processes

From the outset, the Centre for Advanced Studies has tried to strengthen entangled history perspectives, and in so doing, to overcome both a culture-essentialist reification of cultural spaces, which mostly considers such spaces in isolation (and mostly according to current regimes of territorialisation), and theoretical positions, which presuppose a unidirectional diffusion of Western concepts into the rest of the world.

The example of the cultural encounter between the Europeans and Japanese – particularly between Christians and Buddhists – in the 16th and 17th centuries demonstrated that the intercultural comparison and translation process instigated by these encounters both on the European and on the Japanese side resulted in the development of a system of categories relevant to secularity.108 In addition, the idea of a global system of religion and the associated possibility of secularity as a universal classification system was strengthened on all sides through cultural encounters, and particularly through the Jesuit mission.

While cultural encounters and entanglements beyond missionary or colonial contact demand more research, inner-Asian entanglement history, in which above all the spread of Buddhism and Confucianism played a decisive role, has already been the subject of extensive research. In areas influenced by Buddhism, particularly East and Central Asia, strong similarities can be shown when it comes to the binary division into complementary nomospheres (rāja-dharma/buddha-dharma; ōbō/buppō; chos/srid) or into an “ordre spirituel” and an “ordre temporel”.109 This paradigm, probably propagated by Buddhist thinkers for the purposes of institutional self-assertion, was constantly in tension with Confucian ideas of absolute rule by the monarch, to whom all areas of society and normative systems are subordinate. However, the matter of inner-Asian (and the same applies to the MENA region) entanglements and encounters, and their influence on the development of epistemic and social structures relevant to secularity, still needs more attention.

Based on Tenbruck's hypothesis that “cultural encounter was the real field and driving force not just of history, but also of societal development

109 Seyfort Ruegg, *Ordre spirituel et ordre temporel.*
and social differentiation”, our historical focus has been on phases of intensified cultural contact. In such phases, cultures are forced to make comparisons and reflect on them, which can provoke cultural crises but also provoke social dynamics. It will be instructive to examine more closely how epistemic and social structures becoming uncertain and the struggle over boundary demarcations between the religious and the non-religious are tied together in phases of cultural contact.

3 The Centre for Advanced Studies’ Aims in the Second Funding Period (2020–2024)

Some of the research questions, topics and empirical research that will be the focus of our future work follow on directly from our work in the first. We also plan to develop new systematic questions and shift the regional focus of our work. In the first project phase, we significantly improved the operationalisation of the concept of Multiple Secularities and developed new hypotheses about certain contexts, mechanisms and typical configurations. As a result, we can now seek relevant fellows’ research projects in a more targeted fashion and determine the theoretical and empirical gaps in the research more precisely.

3.1 Regional Expansion and Intercultural Encounter

One evident change will result from the shift in our regional focus. In the first project phase, our research intentionally focused on regions and religious traditions that differed greatly (both historically and presently) from ‘the West’. In the second, we intend to consider the West itself in its diversity, investigating internal contrasts, but also mutual entanglements. This does not mean that Europe, particularly the Europe shaped by Latin Christendom, will be the primary focus, prioritised as the starting point for secularity as a binary logic for making distinctions. Instead, Europe will be regarded as part of a complex history of encounters and entanglements

112 As with the term ‘Asia’, we use ‘the West’ as a purely pragmatic placeholder. In the very broadest sense, we are referring to regions shaped by Latin Christendom whose elites do not regard Latin Christendom as an exogenous tradition.
(and thereby be ‘provincialised’\textsuperscript{113}), the result of which was secularity as an ordering principle. We will look, for example, at how intercultural encounter affected the development of European secularities in the course of the almost 800-year era of Al-Andalus and the Reconquista. Our research will not only consider how the European expansion and the Christian mission affected the epistemic and social structures of societies outside Europe. It will also consider the changes that intercultural encounters – which saw a significant acceleration from the 15\textsuperscript{th} century – provoked within Europe itself.\textsuperscript{114}

This shift in perspective is not supposed to deny the formative impact of western European, and later North American, ideas and institutions on the social and epistemic structures in other regions. Rather, we want to understand the global dynamics that resulted in there being an apparently greater need to establish universal concepts for cultural comparison (e.g. ‘religion’) in Europe than in other regions of the world, and that have put Europe in a hegemonic position since the 18\textsuperscript{th} century – a consequence, among other things, of the economic and military power it attained through exploiting colonies. As post-colonial authors have shown,\textsuperscript{115} Europe as a political, economic, military, ideological and academic hegemonic power is itself the product of intercultural encounters. These encounters will be brought into focus in the second funding period.

In addition to western Europe, we will look at the Americas, sub-Saharan Africa, Israel, and areas of eastern Europe and Russia shaped by the Eastern Orthodox Church. However, our primary aim is not to establish a global map of secularities. Instead, we want to investigate differences in the various intercultural encounter situations, and the heterogeneity of the various epistemic and social structures in the cultures involved. Our comparative


\textsuperscript{114} Peter van der Veer, Imperial encounters: Religion and modernity in India and Britain (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001); Roetz, “The Influence of Foreign Knowledge”; José Casanova, “Jesuits, Connectivity, and the Uneven Development of Global Consciousness Since the Sixteenth Century,” in Global Culture: Consciousness and Connectivity, ed. Roland Robertson and Didem Buhari-Gulmez (Farnham: Ashgate, 2016); Kleine, “Premodern Intercultural and Interreligious Dialogues.” Travel and mission reports will be important sources here, as will the descriptions of the world based on these reports, which were particularly popular from the 17\textsuperscript{th} century. In these descriptions, ‘religion’ is used systematically as a comparative concept for global cultural comparison for the first time. See Guy G. Stroumsa, A New Science: The Discovery of Religion in the Age of Reason (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010).

\textsuperscript{115} van der Veer, Imperial Encounters; Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe.
research will thus also look at societal projects for which secularism or, conversely, the role of religion\textsuperscript{116} play a central role and which have resulted in major conflicts over the relationship between the religious and the secular, some of which have extended beyond the demise of the societal project in question. Such projects include the major secularist socialist projects that culminated in the People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union, as well as, in an entirely different way, the Zionist project of establishing a Jewish state of Israel in Palestine.\textsuperscript{117} Equally, revolutionary or nationalist projects in Mexico, France and Turkey, which flew the flag of secularism (and sometimes “assertive secularism”\textsuperscript{118}), would also be relevant.

So far, our research has focused on societies in East, Central, South and Southeast Asia, and the MENA region. The majority of these societies formed relatively strong ‘state’ and ‘religious’ institutions, were shaped by transcendence-oriented voluntarist religions with universal claims to validity, had written traditions that had been cultivated over extended periods, and secured influence over a relatively large geographical area. By contrast, broad parts of Sub-Saharan Africa in pre-colonial times comprised predominantly decentralised structures, and local and oral traditions. The dual power configuration that we previously identified as a significant factor in the emergence of secularity is not as common. Our research may therefore investigate how the relative incompatibility of indigenous epistemic and social structures with those that were enforced violently by the colonial powers influenced the appropriation of Western concepts such as secularism. Here, West African arrangements of state secularity, e.g. in Nigeria, which officially regards itself as a secular state, and Senegal, which took on and adjusted the French principle of laïcité, are of particular interest. Our research will consider how these states treat indigenous religious traditions and forms of ethnic identity politics. We will also explore how forms of laïcité are accommodated alongside indigenous traditions and reworked in relation to these traditions, as well as which types of resistance these forms of laïcité encounter.


\textsuperscript{117} Dan Diner, Israel in Palästina: Über Tausch und Gewalt im Vorderen Orient (Königstein: Athenäum, 1980).

Our initial observations suggest that debates over boundary demarcation and the assignment of social activities or cultural elements to either ‘religion’ or ‘the secular’ (or however such a category is termed) in parts of Africa and the Americas develop their own dynamic as a consequence of complex identity politics. Ethnic identities overlap in part with religious identities, and the question of whether certain practices and affiliations are to be defined according to the religious/secular dual or using ethnic categories, is apparently answered strategically depending on the given situation. In the second funding period, we want to analyse such dynamics and the resultant configurations, such that we can add to our theoretical understanding.

Boundary demarcations between the religious and the secular in minority policy is the subject of public and, particularly, legal disputes in North America too. An example there is the dispute over the religious nature of ritual drug use (e.g. the use of peyote) in the Native American Church. However, the specific colonial and independence history of the British Americas is not only of particular interest when considering whether the practices of indigenous ethnic groups fall under custom or religion. Another topic that deserves closer analysis is the ambivalent (and global) influence of ‘passive secularism’ (which tolerates public religions), which has its roots in colonial history. Since the 1970s, this form of secularism seems to have partly turned into a form of religionism as a consequence of the rise of politicised evangelicalism. For example, Protestantism in the southern states of the US in particular developed a specific perspective on secularity in that it wanted to blur or even shift the boundaries between the state and religion in favour of the latter. Knöbl has emphasised the importance of considering the different colonial histories of different regions, and the

119 Tafjord, “Scales, Translations, and Siding Effects.”
121 Kuru, “Assertive and Passive Secularism.”
123 Wolfgang Knöbl, Die Kontingenz der Moderne: Wege in Europa, Asien Und Amerika (Frankfurt/Main: Campus, 2007), 247; David Goldfield, Southern Histories: Public, Personal, and Sacred (Athen, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2003), 49.
significance of the American Civil War, when researching this subject.\textsuperscript{124} At the same time, and potentially motivated by the same developments, there has been a significant increase in non-affiliation\textsuperscript{125} (with a clear boundary drawn between non-affiliation and atheism\textsuperscript{126}) – a phenomenon that deserves regionally differentiated in-depth historical analysis.

In addition to analysing the extent of power asymmetries and the structural starting conditions for the appropriation of Western norms by the colonised, we will also analyse the different ideological guidelines and (religio-)political interests that determined the process of colonisation on the part of the colonists. Among other things, we might consider whether the power of the Catholic Church and its proximity to the state may have triggered particularly strong defensive reflexes during revolutionary movements, and provoked more radical forms of laicidad, i.e. in Mexico, which aim for a strict limitation of religious influence on non-religious areas of society.\textsuperscript{127} We will also look at non-Western forms of colonialism (e.g. the colonisation of Korea and Taiwan by Japan), particularly in comparison to regions that we examined during the first funding period.

An interesting case for comparison is Israel, where the Zionist project of an ethnic religious state was realised against the backdrop of historical antisemitism and the Holocaust. This coincided with the conspicuously colonial treatment of the local Arab population. The Zionist character of the state, which ties citizenship at least in principle to being Jewish (although whether this is a religious identity is contentious), has major consequences for the shaping of secularity. The specific interrelation of the religious, ethnic, national and secular, and the resulting tensions, especially in an Arab environment, are interesting to examine, particularly in comparison with countries such as pre-war Japan (Shintō as a ‘non-religious state religion’) or present-day India (Hindutva). Starting points for areas to study include the contradictions between religion-based personal laws and demands for secular citizens’ rights (e.g. secular

\textsuperscript{124} Knöbl, \textit{Die Kontingenz der Moderne}.
\textsuperscript{127} Roberto Blancarte, \textit{La república laica en México} (Mexico: Siglo Veintiuno, 2019).
marriage and divorce), as well as everyday confrontations between lifestyles that are increasingly visibly marked as secular or religious.

This focus on different colonisation projects and situations inevitably brings us back to the starting conditions in Europe. While there is often a tendency to speak of ‘Western secularism’ or ‘the Western concept’ of secularity, in Europe too we observe multiple secularities that have developed over time. Even in the course of European integration, there has so far been no indication of a convergence of religious regulation – national path dependencies are evidently quite strong. We want to analyse these path dependencies more closely in the second funding period so we can sharpen our theoretical understanding. One area we will look at is how the principle of subsidiarity in states such as Germany has resulted in apparently paradoxical developments such as the loss of significance of Christianity as a religion coinciding with a gain in the importance of churches as organisations running schools, kindergartens, etc. This will be compared with the situation in more centralist states such as France. We will also explore national differences in terms of tensions – increasingly exacerbated by populist actors – that result from the increase in non-religious parts of the population coinciding with a stronger public presence of minority religiosities.

Orthodox eastern Europe also serves as a ‘laboratory’ for studying divergent developments of secularity. Whether the current adjustment of the relationship between religion and secularity in (Orthodox) eastern European states reflects a reification of theoretical principles of religious dogmas such as the ‘symphonia’ or whether it is more the result of...

128 A number of our fellows have investigated the influence of Islamic law on state personal law: A. Safa’at (Muchamad Ali Safa’at, “Indonesian Secularities: On the Influence of the State-Islam Relationship on Legal and Political Developments,” Working Paper Series of the CASHSS “Multiple Secularities – Beyond the West, Beyond Modernities” 13 (Leipzig University, 2019)) and Anna Mrozek (for Indonesia), Anindita Chakrabarti and Suchandra Gosh (for India) and Saïd A. Arjomand (for Tunisia).


concrete and highly conflictual negotiation processes (the outcome of which is entirely open), needs further clarification. There is evidence to suggest that numerous entirely contingent factors generated their own secularisation paths within Orthodox Europe as well. We should investigate whether the social consequences of transformation and the inefficiency of secular state institutions in the course of post-socialist change resulted in religious authorities and norms gaining validity at the same time as society individualised and globalised. Apparently fragile nation-building processes also seem to strengthen religious self-assertion and contribute to an increasing culturalisation of the religious where abstaining from ritual and de facto distance from faith is combined with a general acknowledgement of religion as part of one's identity.

We have observed comparable culturalisation processes, which make allocating certain actions, places and symbols to the categories ‘religious’ or ‘secular’ (that is, as part of culture or tradition) difficult and legally controversial in China, Japan and Indonesia. In the second project phase, an additional systematic focus will be the analysis of culturalisation processes that run counter to the model of a binary distinction between the religious and the secular that is typical for modernity, because they raise questions about some kind of ‘post-secularity’ and the critique of Western modernity as a whole.

In the second project phase, we will also make a systematic comparison of the critical juncture of colonialism and imperialism, and the so-called Sattelzeit (‘threshold period’), taking into consideration different regional experiences. Our aim will be to identify factors that make certain configurations of secularity more likely than others. We will particularly consider intercultural encounters as a catalyst for the reconfiguration of epistemic and social structures on both sides.

At the theoretical level, we will continue to address questions that have yet to be conclusively answered regarding the relationship between epistemic and social structures, contingency and path probability, structural restriction and individual agency when it comes to the form of

---


the relationship between religious and secular areas of society in global modernity. We will also continue to investigate the relationship between different levels of differentiation. To address the differentiation between the secular and the religious at the level of interaction, we intend to expand our thematic focus in addition to our regional focus.

Some projects focused on the MENA region and Asia will continue with the findings from empirical and historical research to date serving as a point of comparison for other regions. By expanding our regional focus, we will predominantly look at different starting conditions and consequently investigate different configurations and mechanisms. This should ensure that we attain a higher level of theoretical saturation.

3.2 Systematic Perspectives
3.2.1 Critical Junctures and Path Probabilities
Our observations suggest that at historical turning points where endogenous and/or exogenous factors make a reconfiguration of social and epistemic structures inevitable, the very same structures are explicitly reflected upon and become the subject of controversial negotiation processes, and thus visible. To identify situations where reconfigurations of epistemic and social structures appear inevitable, understand their dynamics and, not least, to delimit the time frame for historical analyses for practical reasons, we want to make use of the theoretical framework of ‘critical junctures’ and ‘path dependencies’ in secularity research. The Sattelzeit, the beginning of the global condition and the age of colonialism132 and imperialism naturally play an important but not an exclusive role here. In future, we want to focus even more on critical junctures. It is assumed that reference problems (the problems to which concepts of secularity refer) become more clearly visible, and corresponding guiding ideas are formulated more explicitly at these historical crossroads where, for a certain amount of time, significantly

132 It should be kept in mind that there was no single ‘colonialism’ but a multitude of different colonial projects and very different colonial situations and experiences. For an attempt to identify epistemic and social structures of an extreme longue durée which conditioned the path dependencies that shape the specific form of secularity in modernity, see Christoph Kleine, “Formations of Secularity in Ancient Japan? On Cultural Encounters, Critical Junctures, and Path-Dependent Processes,” in “Secularities in Japan,” ed. Ugo Dessi and Christoph Kleine, in “Secularities in Japan,” special issue, Journal of Religion in Japan 8, no. 1–3 (2019).
more courses of action are available than before or after, and actors are forced to make decisions.

A fundamental hypothesis for us is that the way epistemic and social structures are reconfigured is subject to certain *path probabilities*. That is to say that existing epistemic and social structures create crucial cultural pre-conditions for the acquisition of Western ordering principles, knowledge systems and institutions that can explain, at least in part, differences in the concrete configuration of ‘secularities’. In line with this theory, social and epistemic structures can be seen as factors which, within a complex ensemble of contingent influences, make radical changes or upheavals less likely or help determine the path of change. These structures are path probabilities in a non-deterministic sense and are sensitive to contingent factors.\(^{133}\)

In the course of numerous discussions, questions have formed regarding the use of the concepts of *critical junctures*, *path dependencies*, and *path probabilities*. The following questions will be explored further during the second project phase in related sub-projects: (1) How can path probabilities be identified, and how can we avoid retrospective deterministic interpretations based on knowledge of the result of a historical process? (2) In comparison, how can contingent factors be isolated and how can we determine their significance for path probabilities? (3) What is the relationship that the agency of relevant actors has with existing structures and contingent events? (4) How can developments be identified that have not prevailed historically but serve as reference points for current developments?

### 3.2.2 Culturalisation of Religion, Materiality of the Secular

In our work so far, we have encountered forms of culturalisation of the religious in a number of different contexts with very different implications.

---

\(^{133}\) Knöbl, *Die Kontingenz der Moderne*, 252. An example: where clear distinctions between worldly and other-worldly responsibilities, material and spiritual responsibilities, and responsibilities dealing with immanence and those dealing with transcendence are institutionalised, it is probable that secularity will be chosen as a binary modality for making distinctions and given legal validity. However, corresponding emic practices of distinction and differentiation are not a determining prerequisite for secularity. Secularity can also occur simply as a result of (voluntary or forced) adaptation, e.g. in the context of the introduction of modern constitutions, which almost always refers back to Western examples.
We have encountered this phenomenon in the identity politics of political elites acting in collaboration with ethnic/cultural majorities (e.g. in Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Quebec, India and Japan), as well as in identity politics employed as a strategic means for minorities to assert themselves (e.g. in Latin America, North America, and Australia). When culturalisation as a majority project is implemented ‘from above’ to counter cultural diversity and migrant religiosity, this can be combined with a shift toward a public religion. By contrast, the Chinese government defining ‘popular religion’ (minjian xinyang) as ‘non-material cultural heritage’ (feiwuzhi wenhua yichan) is more indicative of a form of ‘secularisation from above’ which makes the cultivation of local customs possible without softening highly restrictive policy on religion. We want to explore such dynamics from a comparative perspective.

On a theoretical and conceptual level, we should consider whether we are dealing with a creeping revision of the modern process of religionisation and whether the binary schema of secularity is losing plausibility and effectiveness in the post-modern era. We might also want to consider whether corresponding trends are to be interpreted as indicators of religions increasingly being perceived again as complex, multifunctional sociocultural formations, which provide affectual and aesthetic as well as cognitive and normative modalities of orientation; and as such, religions act as creators of collective identities, resulting in a series of societally and politically relevant conflicts over boundary demarcation and allocation, some of which are fought at the legal level. These conflicts appear to be intensified by the existence of religious minorities. Forms of intercultural contact and comparison play a decisive role here, too.

In the second funding period, we want to explore this lifeworld dimension of secularity, which has increasingly become the target of the law, public opinion, and discourses on identity, much more closely. In addition to conceptual distinctions, markers of both religion and secularity play an important role here. These concern different forms of symbolisation, such as symbolically loaded dress codes and bodily practices, but also conflicts over food rules, the symbolic significance of space and time, lifestyles, etc. By broadening our perspective to

lifeworld and, above all, material aspects, we want to make effective use of theoretical approaches such as that of “material religion”\textsuperscript{136} in our investigation of secularity. Nowadays, it is indeed the case that conflicts over the boundaries of the religious are becoming inflamed; and these conflicts primarily relate to the material (and embodied). Think, for example, of conflicts surrounding the construction of mosques, the use of prayer rooms in public buildings, circumcision of boys, or wearing headscarves. This suggests that material things should not only be seen as ‘symbols’ or conveyors of meaning that can ‘be read’.\textsuperscript{137} Instead, one ought to consider that they are closely tied to the socio-cultural identity of human beings, and socio-cultural relationships are constituted through material culture.\textsuperscript{138} Material forms such as headscarves or crucifixes not only create identity, they also ‘do’ something to people, as they trigger or influence social action and determine how situations are interpreted.\textsuperscript{139} Approaches concerning the aesthetics\textsuperscript{140} and aesthetics\textsuperscript{141} of religion also deserve closer attention in this regard.

This raises the question as to whether there is a genuine \textit{materiality of the secular} and, potentially, associated \textit{sensational forms},\textsuperscript{142} or whether the materialisation of the secular is a secondary phenomenon, i.e. the result of drawing a boundary with religious materiality. This ties in with classical sociological theory such as Durkheim’s work on totemism.\textsuperscript{143} Our interest

\textsuperscript{140} Susanne Lanwerd, \textit{Religionsästhetik: Studien zum Verhältnis von Symbol und Sinnlichkeit} (Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann, 2002).
is in *forms of everyday life* and *habitus* (e.g. clothing and food as a means of distinction) and the *drawing of material and symbolic boundaries* with ‘the religious’ or ‘the secular’. There appear to be revealing conflict negotiation processes surrounding *defining public space*, such as those pertaining to the matter of adequate swimwear (‘burkinis’), which is then contrasted in populist commentary with something that is invoked as secular (e.g. bikinis). At the same time, everyday negotiation is much more nuanced than populist responses would have us believe.\(^{144}\)

Such negotiations are also connected to forms of demarcation of public spaces, and the ways in which public spaces are accorded symbolism. These processes simultaneously define in practical terms what the public space is and how it relates to and is distinguished from/by ‘the religious’ within it. Such definition processes can currently be observed in Russia in relation to the public presence of Orthodoxy, with numerous new church buildings, the restitution of church property and changes in the rights of use of formerly secularised spaces.\(^{145}\) Further examples are disputes about religious exhibits in museums and questions of the appropriate handling of sacred artefacts in secular spaces, which also question the character of the museum as a secular space. Examples of such boundary demarcation conflicts can be found in a number of countries and are suitable subjects for comparative research.\(^{146}\)

When examining disputes regarding the structure of the public space, one must also consider emotions and bodily experiences (e.g. collective or individual agitation over acts of ‘blasphemy’, which, according to Mahmood, is perceived by the Muslim minority as “moral injury” and supposedly collides with a “secular rationality”\(^{147}\)), understandings of space and time (e.g. boundary demarcation conflicts as a result of religious activities in public spaces or the interpretation and form of religious holidays).

---


\(^{146}\) Our fellow Philip Clart is researching the museumisation of religious objects in secular museums and religious museums, particularly in Taiwan.

3.2.3 Art, Culture, and Architecture as Spheres of Activity

In addition to the spheres of activity that we have already explored (namely politics, law and medicine), we plan to conduct transregional comparative and historical research on art (including architecture, music and theatre) in relation to the differentiation of the secular and the religious.\(^{148}\)

Aesthetic material objects and artefacts are important for religious rituals and practices in (almost) all religious communities. In Christianity, a charged attitude regarding the appropriate handling of such objects can be seen early on in disputes over objects from antiquity. The recent view, primarily voiced in the field of sociology of materiality, that these objects are not only an expression or representation of the social – and thus also of the religious – but also function as its medium and thus contribute to its creation,\(^{149}\) seems to have always been acknowledged by contemporaries, especially those engaged in religion. This particularly applies to sacred architecture and raises the question of whether there is a corresponding materiality of the secular and of secularity and how this might be identified.

The field of architecture lends itself particularly well to such an investigation. The Paulinum at Leipzig University is an instructive example. The building functions as both an assembly hall and a university church but separates the religious and the secular with a moveable plexiglass wall.\(^{150}\) This raises questions about the existence of comparable forms of ‘constructed’ distinction in other contexts and their discursive framing. The architectural design (and identification) of the secular could be explored through the great building projects of the 20\(^{th}\) century, which were decidedly committed to secular ideas. Comparative cultural studies on India, Brazil, Russia and Turkey are examples.\(^{151}\) But we would also benefit from looking at European architectural history, including the debates at the beginning of the 20\(^{th}\) century about whether and how modern church architecture should distinguish itself from increasingly dominant secular constructions.

---

(cinemas, train stations, department stores, villas etc.)152 Here the connection between discourses, actors and material forms of expression becomes visible and raises the question as to how distinctions manifest in the various settings. In any event, it seems that it is not only “the symbolic character of religious buildings and objects” that provokes conflicts, but also “concrete questions about the material implementation and form of religious practice, as well as the implied demarcation from the secular environment.”153 Even early Christianity addressed the question of whether pictures, statues, places and buildings etc. have a religious quality themselves, or whether they ‘only’ function as symbols of that which is ‘actually’ religious. Belting’s distinction between “cult images” and “images used for didactic purposes” is instructive here.154

In European modernity, artists increasingly insisted on keeping art free of religious references and claims, and on emphasising its intrinsic logic.155 This was the case for visual art, music and literature. We will investigate whether and how justifications drawing on secularity are identifiable in these debates on autonomy, and to which reference problems the guiding idea of autonomy refers. The autonomy of art has since been demanded as vehemently as it has been contradicted – both by religion and theology, and by art and artists themselves. The fact that this permanent boundary work can also be found, in a similar vein, in the performing arts of western European and North American Muslim migrants,156 and is explosively present in literature and visual arts in Egypt157 and India, advocates comparative research focused primarily on contemporary debates and conflicts.

4 Bibliography


Bochinger, Christoph. “Das Verhältnis zwischen Religion und Säkularität als Gegenstand religionswissenschaftlicher Forschung.” In Säkularität in religionswissenschaftlicher


Jiyūminshutō Kaisē Suijin Honbu 自由民主党 憲法改正推進本部 自由民主党 憲法改正推進本部 [Liberal Democratic Constitutional Reform Promotion Headquaters]. “Nihonkoku Kenpō Kaisei Sōan Q&A (Sōhoban) 日本国憲法改正草案Q&A (増補版).” 2013.


Kleine, Christoph. “Premodern Intercultural and Interreligious Dialogues and the Formation of Comparative Concepts: How Encounters Between European missionaries and Japanese in the 16th and 17th centuries changed the conceptual world.” NotaBene, no. 44 (Part I) (Part II).


McCutcheon, Russell T. “They Licked the Platter Clean: On the Co-


Riesebrodt, Martin. “Was ist ‘religiöser


Schwinn, Thomas. “Wertspären, Lebensordnungen und Lebensführungen.” In
Verantwortliches Handeln in
gesellschaftlichen Ordnungen: Beiträge
to Wolfgang Schluchters Religion und
Lebensführung. Edited by Agathe
Bienfait and Gerhard Wagner,
270–319. Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp,
1998.

Schwinn, Thomas. “Zur Neubestimmung
des Verhältnisses von Religion
und Moderne: Säkularisierung,
Differenzierung und multiple
Modernitäten.” In “Religion und
Gesellschaft.” Edited by Christof Wolf
and Matthias Koenig. Special issue 53,
Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und

Schwinn, Thomas, Clemens
Kroneberg, and Jens Greve,
eds. Soziale Differenzierung:
Handlungstheoretische Zugänge in der
Diskussion. Wiesbaden: Verlag für
Sozialwissenschaften, 2011.

Seiwert, Hubert. “Religiöser
Nonkonformismus in säkularen
Gesellschaften.” Zeitschrift für
Religionswissenschaft 23, no. 1 (2015):
35–66.

Seiwert, Hubert. “Politics.” In The Oxford
Handbook of the Study of Religion.
Edited by Michael Stausberg and
Steven Engler, 430–49. Oxford:

Seiwert, Hubert. “The Dynamics of
Religions and Cultural Evolution:
Worshipping Fuxi in Contemporary
China.” In Dynamics of Religion.
Edited by Christoph Bochinger and
Jörg Rüpke, 9–30. Berlin: De Gruyter,
2016.

Seyfort Ruegg, David. Ordre spirituel
et ordre temporel dans la pensée
bouddhique de l’Inde et du Tibet. Paris:

Sheehan, Jonathan. “When was
Disenchantment? History and the
Secular Age.” In Varieties of Secularism
in a Secular Age. Edited by Michael
Warner, Jonathan Vanantwerpen, and
Craig Calhoun, 217–42. Cambridge,

Smith, Christian. “Introduction:
Rethinking the secularization
of American public life.” In The
Secular Revolution: Power, interests,
and conflict in the secularization
of American public life. Edited by
Christian Smith, 1–95. Berkeley, CA:

Stark, Rodney. “Secularization, R.I.P.”
Sociology of Religion 60, no. 3 (1999):
249–73.

Stausberg, Michael. “Distinctions,
Differentiations, Ontology, and
Non-humans in Theories of Religion.”
Method and Theory in the Study of

Stausberg, Michael, ed.
Religionswissenschaft: Ein

Steckel, Sita. “Differenzierung jenseits
der Moderne: Eine Debatte zu
mittelalterlicher Religion und
moderner Differenzierungstheorie.”
Frühmittelalterliche Studien 47, no. 1

Stowers, Stanley. “The Ontology of
Religion.” In Introducing Religion:
Essays in Honor of Jonathan Z. Smith.
Edited by Willi Braun and Russell
T. McCutcheon, 434–49. London:
Equinox, 2008.

Streicher, Ruth, and Adrian Hermann.
“Religion’ in Thailand in the 19th
Century.” In Companion to the Study
of Secularity. Edited by CASHSS
“Multiple Secularities – Beyond the
West, Beyond Modernities.” Leipzig
University, 2019.


Weber, Max. “‘Objektivität’ sozialwissenschaftlicher und sozialpolitischer Erkenntnis.”


